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Indirect reciprocity is one of the main mechanisms to explain the emergence and sustainment of altruism
in societies. The standard approach to indirect reciprocity is reputation models. These are games in which
players base their decisions on their opponent’s reputation gained in past interactions with other players (moral
assessment). The combination of actions and moral assessment leads to a large diversity of strategies; thus
determining the stability of any of them against invasions by all the others is a difficul task. We use a variant
of a previously introduced reputation-based model that let us systematically analyze all these invasions and
determine which ones are successful. Accordingly, we are able to identify the third-order strategies (those which,
apart from the action, judge considering both the reputation of the donor and that of the recipient) that are
evolutionarily stable. Our results reveal that if a strategy resists the invasion of any other one sharing its same
moral assessment, it can resist the invasion of any other strategy. However, if actions are not always witnessed,
cheaters (i.e., individuals with a probability of defecting regardless of the opponent’s reputation) have a chance to
defeat the stable strategies for some choices of the probabilities of cheating and of being witnessed. Remarkably,
by analyzing this issue with adaptive dynamics we fin that whether an honest population resists the invasion of
cheaters is determined by a Hamilton-like rule, with the probability that the cheat is discovered playing the role
of the relatedness parameter.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.87.052810 PACS number(s): 89.75.Fb, 02.50.−r, 87.10.−e, 87.23.−n
I. INTRODUCTION
The human being is the social animal par excellence. An
individual can help another even if it is the firs time they meet
or if they know that they will never meet again. Several mech-
anisms have been proposed to explain cooperation between
unrelated individuals. Among them reciprocity, either direct or
indirect, stands as one of the most successful explanations of
altruism [1]. In direct reciprocity individuals pay back the help
received in repeated encounters with the same partner (“I help
you if you helpme”) [2]. In society, however,many interactions
have low chances to be repeated with the same individual. To
explain altruism in those interactions, the concept of indirect
reciprocity was introduced [3,4]. Through this mechanism,
individuals do not receive the consequences of their actions
directly from the individuals they interact with but indirectly
through society (“I help others to be helped by others”). Indi-
rect reciprocity is an important mechanism for the emergence
and sustainment of altruism not only in small-scale human
societies [5–9] but in other species aswell [10]. And it certainly
plays an important role in communication networks [11,12].
There are two types of indirect reciprocity: upstream and
downstream. In upstream reciprocity [13,14] an individual opts
for a given action taking into account if she was previously
helped or not. In this respect upstream reciprocity is more
akin to a learning mechanism because individuals adapt
their choices based on their past experience. In downstream
reciprocity, also called reputation-based indirect reciprocity,
an individual assigns a reputation to the others, taking into
account how they interactwith the rest of the society [6,15–18].
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These reputations allow her to decide whether she should
help these individuals or not in potential future encounters
with them. Accordingly, downstream indirect reciprocity is
a cognitively very demanding task: it requires observation,
memory, and communication. It is this reputation-based
indirect reciprocity that will be the focus of the present work.
Two different kinds of models of reputation-based indirect
reciprocity have been considered in the literature. In indirect
observation models [16] each action is observed and judged
only by one individual, who spreads this information across
the population through verbal communication and gossip.
Therefore all individuals share the same opinion about each
other. On the contrary, in direct observation models [17,19,20]
everyone witnesses the action and makes a private judgment
of it. Thus individuals’ different opinions about the rest of the
members of the society can coexist in this kind of model.
Ohtsuki and Iwasa [16] and Brandt and Sigmund [17] have
proposed a classificatio of the different strategies in games
with indirect reciprocity through their assessment and action
modules. Strategies can be classifie either as second-order
or as third-order strategies. In both cases, the reputation is
assigned taking into account the observed action and the
reputation of the individual who received it. But third-order
strategies also look at the reputation of the individual who
performs the action. The dynamics of second-order assess-
ments has been explored in [21]. Ohtsuki and Iwasa [16] also
studied systematically the evolutionary stability of third-order
strategies. Their model is an indirect observation model, and
therefore the whole society shares the same moral assessment.
Stability is studied by confronting strategies with different
action rules. They concluded that there are eight strategies,
the so-called leading eight, which are evolutionarily stable
strategies (ESS) under these assumptions. The meaning and
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success of these strategies has also been studied by Ohtsuki
and Iwasa [22]. On the other hand, Uchida and Sigmund [23]
have chosen some of the leading eight strategies that share the
same action rules but have different moral assessments and
have confronted them in a model with private opinions.
In this work, we extend the systematic study carried out by
Ohtsuki and Iwasa confronting strategies with different moral
assessments. Unlike their work, we use a direct observation
model in which individuals no longer share the same opinion
about the rest of the population. We introduce the concept of
coherence as a measure of the relation between the moral as-
sessment and the action rules of a strategy and study how it re-
lates to the stability and efficien y of the strategies.We identify
which strategies resist the invasion of all the other strategies,
i.e., which combinations of moral assessment and action rules
emerge under this evolutionary competition. Finally, we ex-
plore the effect that an action is witnessed by no one in the pop-
ulation. Individuals can then face the risk to cheat, i.e., defect
regardless of the opponent’s reputation, at no reputation cost.
The present paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II we
introduce the model. In Sec. III we describe its mathematical
implementation. We study homogeneous populations and
discuss their stability against invasions by other strategies. We
also analyze the effect on introducing the probability of cheat-
ing when actions have a chance not to be witnessed. Finally,
our results are shown in Sec. IV and are discussed in Sec. V.
II. MODEL
Brandt and Sigmund [17] introduced a very stylized model
of indirect reciprocity based on reputation, and Ohtsuki and
Iwasa [16,22] investigated the stability of its strategies under
the assumption that all individuals share the same moral
judgment.
The model we will be dealing with in this work is a slight
modificatio of this basic model. It consists of an infinite well-
mixed population of interacting and judging individuals. Every
time step a pair of individuals are randomly and equiprobably
drawn from the population. One of them plays the role of
the donor and the other one of the recipient. The donor then
decides whether to pay a cost c > 0 to help (C) the recipient or
not (D). If the recipient is helped, she receives a benefi b > c.
This action is observed by every individual of the population
(including themselves). Observers privately judge the donor
for the action taken on the recipient according to their own
moral assessment and assign her a reputation, either good
(G) or bad (B), accordingly. Therefore every individual in the
population has a private opinion of every other individual,
including herself.
This process is repeated until the population reaches an
equilibrium (we will defin this equilibrium in more precise
terms in the next section). Then the average payoff that every
individual receives in this repeated game is computed. Direct
reciprocity is excluded from this game because the population
is virtually infinite hence the probability that two people meet
again is negligible.
We consider third-order indirect reciprocity; i.e., each
strategy is described by two moduli: the action rules and the
moral assessments. The action rules determine what the donor
must do (either help or refuse to help) given the reputation
of both players. Specificall , aiαβ = 1 (C) if strategist i with
reputation α helps an individual with reputation β (both
according to i’s moral judgments) and 0 (D) otherwise.
The moral assessments tell the individual if the action just
witnessed should be judged as good or bad, hence revising the
donor’s reputation. Specificall , miαβ(a) = 1 (G) if strategist
i assigns a good reputation to a donor previously judged α by
i, who performs an action a on a recipient previously judged
β by i, and is 0 (B) otherwise.
Thus each strategy is define by 12 numbers: 4 for the
action module and 8 for the moral module. This amounts to
4096 different possible strategies. Although a thorough study
of mutual invasions and the coexistence of different strategies,
such as that performed in Ref. [24] for a direct reciprocity
model, would be desirable, the abundance of strategies forbids
it, and we content ourselves with a pairwise test of mutual
invadability.
Wewill assume that sometimes players do not act according
to their action rules [16,19,25–27]. Thus, with a probability A
a donor defects regardless of her action rules, and with 1 − A
she performs the action she planned to. Another source of
errors is misjudgment; i.e., an individual can make a mistake
in interpreting the action. In this category lies social pressure.
This is a kind of error that is especially important if the
information on the action performed is spread by gossiping
because, then, a misjudgment of the witness will lead to a
misjudgment of the entire population. Otherwise, it affects
only a small fraction of the individuals. Since keeping track
of errors may lead to a proliferation of judgments, even
between individuals sharing the same moral assessment, and
may render the model computationally unfeasible, we will
content ourselves by implementing only errors in the action.
III. MATHEMATICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE MODEL
A. Homogeneous populations
Let us start by assuming that there is only one strategy i
present in the population. Let xi be the fraction of individuals
considered good by the whole population (there is a unique
moral assessment). Then the rate of change of xi is given by
dxi
dt
=
∑
αβ
χα(xi)χβ(xi)Pi,αβ − xi, (1)
where Pi,αβ is the probability that a donor of reputation α
acting on a recipient with reputation β is considered good by
the population. This probability can be obtained as
Pi,αβ = (1− A)miαβ(aiαβ) + Amiαβ(D) (2)
because with probability A no help is provided and with
probability 1 − A the action performed is aiαβ , as prescribed
by the action module. We have also introduced the auxiliary
function χγ (xi),
χγ (xi) = γ xi + (1 − γ )(1− xi), (3)
which in this case represents the fraction of individuals with
reputation γ .
The dynamics reaches an equilibrium when xi =∑
αβ χα(xi)χβ(xi)Pi,αβ . Therefore the fraction of good
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individuals in a homogeneous population in equilibrium is
the solution 0  xi  1 of the quadratic equation F (xi) = 0,
where
F (xi) = x2i (Pi,11 + Pi,00 − Pi,10 − Pi,01)
+ xi(Pi,10 + Pi,01 − 2Pi,00 − 1) + Pi,00. (4)
As F (0) = Pi,00  0 and F (1) = Pi,11 − 1  0, there is al-
ways a solution in [0,1], but in some cases there may be
two (when Pi,00 = 0 or Pi,11 = 1 or both), one stable and one
unstable, and there is a degenerate case [when all coefficient
in F (xi) vanish] in which any xi is a solution. In this
latter case, adding a small error m in the moral assessment
determines uniquely a stable solution. When the population
is homogeneous, this can be done at no computational cost
by simply replacing Pi,αβ in Eq. (4) by (1 − 2m)Pi,αβ + m.
This yields the expression F (xi) = m(1 − 2xi), whose only
root is xi = 1/2, regardless of m. Hence we take this solution,
which holds even in the limit m → 0, as the solution of this
degenerate case.
Given the equilibrium fraction xiH , the probability that an
individual helps another is
θiH = (1 − a)
∑
αβ
χα(xiH )χβ(xiH )aiαβ . (5)
Therefore the average payoff that any individual in this
population obtains is
WiH = (b − c)θiH . (6)
As the whole population shares the same strategy, it can be
regarded a measure of “self-efficien y.” This provides a mean
to classify strategies.
Coherence provides an alternative classificatio criterion.
Given an action a that a donor with reputation α performs on
a recipient with reputation β, we call an individual coherent
if placed on the donor’s feet she performs the same action a
when she morally assesses it as good and the opposite action
1 − a when she morally assesses it as bad. In other words, an
individual is coherent if she performs actions that she judges
as good and does the opposite for actions that she judges as
bad. Thus we can introduce a coherency index h as
hi = 1
2
∑
αβ a
[1 − |miαβ(a) − δ(a,aiαβ )|]χα(xiH )χβ(xiH ), (7)
where δ(x,y) = 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise. This index can
range from 0 (no coherence) to 1 (full coherence). Notice that
the coherence of a strategy can change when more strategies
are present in the population because it depends on the fraction
of good and bad individuals. Nevertheless, for the sake of
classification we have define this index for a homogeneous
population so that it is uniquely determined by xiH and
therefore is an intrinsic feature of each strategy.
B. Stability of strategies
Consider now a homogeneous populationwhere individuals
share the same resident strategy. From time to time a small
fraction of the population can adopt a newmutant strategy. This
mutant strategy will eventually invade the resident population
if mutants obtain a higher payoff than residents.
Calculating these payoffs requires computing the four
fractions of individuals that are considered good and bad by
the firs and the second strategies in equilibrium. In the limit
where the fraction of mutants is very small both residents
and mutants interact only with residents. The dynamics of
these four fractions of individuals is given in this limit by the
equations
dx
	1	2
1
dt
=
∑
α1α2
β1β2
x
α1α2
1 x
β1β2
1 P
	1	2
1,α1β1,α2β2
− x	1	21 , (8)
dx
	1	2
2
dt
=
∑
α1α2
β1β2
x
α1α2
2 x
β1β2
1 P
	1	2
2,α1β1,α2β2
− x	1	22 , (9)
where x	1	2i are the fractions of i strategists (i = 1 for
residents and i = 2 for mutants) who are judged 	1 by
residents and 	2 by mutants; P
	1	2
i,α1β1,α2β2
is the probability
that an i strategist with reputation α1 for residents and α2
for mutants, acting on a recipient of the resident population
with reputation β1 for other residents and β2 for mutants, is
judged 	1 by residents and 	2 by mutants. The form of this
probability is
P
	1	2
i,α1β1,α2β2
= (1− A)δ(	1,m1α1β1 (aiαiβi ))δ(	2,m2α2β2 (aiαiβi ))
+ Aδ(	1,m1α1β1 (D))δ(	2,m2α2β2 (D)). (10)
Equations (8) and (9) can be simplifie in the equilibrium.
Nonetheless, some of the equations need to be numerically
solved (see Appendix A). To this purpose we must start from a
sensible initial condition. We will assume that just before the
invasion begins, all individuals, both mutants and residents,
share the same opinion about everybody. The rationale for
this choice is that, before the change of strategy undergone
by mutants takes place, the population was homogeneous.
Therefore xGGi (0) = xiH , xBBi (0) = 1 − xiH and xGBi (0) =
xBGi (0) = 0.
Once the fractions in equilibrium x	1	2i are known, the
probabilities θi,j that an i strategist helps a j strategist (i,j =
1,2) are obtained as
θ1,j = (1− A)
∑
αβ
χα
(
xG∗1
)
χβ
(
xG∗j
)
a1αβ,
(11)
θ2,j = (1− A)
∑
αβ
χα
(
x∗G2
)
χβ
(
x∗Gj
)
a2αβ,
where we have introduced the short-hand notation xG∗i =∑
	2
x
G	2
i and x
∗G
i =
∑
	1
x
	1G
i to denote the sum over a
given reputation. Obviously, xG∗i (x
∗G
i ) is the fraction of i
strategists that are judged as good by the resident (mutant)
players irrespective of the mutant’s (resident’s) judgment.
Finally, the average payoff W (i|j ) that an i strategist
receives from a j strategist can be computed as
W (i|j ) =
{
(b − c) θi,i , i = j,
b θj,i − c θi,j , i = j. (12)
The resident population cannot be invaded by the mutants
if W (1|1) > W (2|1) or if W (1|1) = W (2|1) and W (1|2) >
W (2|2). If the resident strategy resists the invasions of all the
other mutant strategies, it is considered evolutionarily stable.
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TABLE I. Coherent stable strategies and their normalized average payoffs W˜H for the case b/c = 2 and A = 0.01. The top eight strategies
(labeled Ia to IIIb) are the so-called leading eight [16]. They are the ones with the highest payoffs among all the stable strategies obtained for a
given benefit-to-cos ratio b/c.
mGG(C) mGG(D) mGB (C) mGB (D) mBG(C) mBG(D) mBB (C) mBB (D) aGG aGB aBG aBB W˜H
Ia G B G G G B G B C D C C 0.9902
Ib G B B G G B G B C D C C 0.9902
IIa G B G G G B G G C D C D 0.9901
IIb G B G G G B B G C D C D 0.9901
IIc G B B G G B G G C D C D 0.9901
IId G B B G G B B G C D C D 0.9901
IIIa G B G G G B B B C D C D 0.9900
IIIb G B B G G B B B C D C D 0.9900
G B B B G B G B C D C C 0.9135
G B B B G B G G C D C D 0.9049
G B B B G B B G C D C D 0.9049
G B B G B B G B C D D C 0.8340
G B G G B B G B C D D C 0.8340
G B B G B B B G C D D D 0.8264
G B B G B B G G C D D D 0.8264
G B G G B B B G C D D D 0.8264
G B G G B B G G C D D D 0.8264
B B B G G B B B D D C D 0.2500
B B G G G B B B D D C D 0.2500
eight strategies with the highest payoff correspond to the
so-called “leading eight” [16]. These strategies are present
in all cases shown in Fig. 1. All stable strategies have some
common features: (i) not helping good individuals is always
considered bad, (ii) good individuals never help bad ones, and
(iii) good individuals always help good individuals, except
when errors occur, and that is judged as good. (There are two
strategies for which the last feature is quite the opposite, but
they receive rather low payoffs.)
Notice that the absence of errors in the moral assessments
renders all defective strategies (strategies that always defect)
vulnerable to invasions. Ohtsuki and Iwasa [16] found that all
defective strategies were stable; the reason is that, although
these strategies are never rewarding, errors in judgments
provide them some payoff. This does not happen in the present
model. Thus defective strategies are no longer stable.
Once we identifie the strategies that cannot be invaded
by others with the same moral assessments, we studied which
of them are actually stable against the invasion by any other
strategy. We have found that all those strategies remain stable
even if strategies with different moral assessments try to
invade them. We have also checked that strategies that can be
invaded by other strategies with the same moral assessment
can be invaded by some strategies with different moral
assessment as well.
B. Robustness against initial misjudgments
Wehave checked the sensitivity of these results with respect
to a different choice of the initial conditions to solve Eqs. (8)
and (9). In Sec. III B we made the assumption that, before a
mutation occurs, all individuals share the same opinion about
everybody because the population is homogeneous. Initial
misjudgments can lead a fraction of the population to disagree
with the general opinion. This choice for initial conditionsmay
be modeled as
xGGi (0) =
(
1 − Br
)
xiH ,
xGBi (0) = Br xiH , xBBi (0) =
(
1 − Gr
)
(1 − xiH ), (13)
xBGi (0) = Gr (1 − xiH ),
where Br (
G
r ) is the fraction of individuals that are misjudged
as bad (good) by the mutants. Note that if Br = Gr = 0, the
whole population agrees in its judgments, and we recover the
former initial conditions.
Depending on the (small) values of Br and 
G
r , we
have checked that the initial conditions (13) may lead to
three different scenarios. In the firs one xGGi = xiH , xBBi =
1 − xiH , and xGBi = xBGi = 0, so that misjudgments fade
away, and we recover a homogeneous population. In the
second scenario initial misjudgments remain or even grow
(xGGi and x
BB
i decrease and x
GB
i and x
BG
i increase), but the
payoff obtained by the mutants is lower than that obtained
by the residents. Consequently, the mutants are expelled,
and a homogeneous population is restored. In the third
scenario initial misjudgments also remain, and the mutants
obtain higher payoffs than the residents, so that misjudgments
eventually spread. We have found that around 850 strategies
lie in this last case (considering differences between mutants’
and residents’ payoffs higher than 10−6) when b/c = 2 and
A = 0.01. Fortunately, none of these strategies belong to the
group of stable ones, so this misjudgment spreading does not
affect the evolutionary fate of the population.
C. Stability in the presence of cheating
Consider now the situation in which actions are not always
witnessed; instead, there is a chance that they pass unnoticed
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of the population. Thus, if only small mutations are allowed in
an honest population, we fin the Hamilton-like rule bpdis > c
for the survival of cooperation [28].
Increasing A makes it even easier for cheaters to invade,
with the exception of the strategies belonging to group III,
which seem to be insensitive to the effect of errors in action.
V. DISCUSSION
We have carried out a systematic study of the stability
of all possible third-order indirect reciprocity strategies. We
extended the work of Ohtsuki and Iwasa [16] confronting all
the strategies against the others regardless of whether they
have the same moral assessments or not. The main difference
with their model is that in ours individuals directly witness all
actions. Allowing individuals in the same population to have
different moral assessments and action rules makes indirect
observationmodels computationally unfeasible (wemust store
everybody’s opinion of everybody else at every time step). For
the same reason, errors in judgments cannot be accounted for
in direct observation models. Thus we only consider errors in
performing the actions. The only exception to this assumption
is the need to introduce errors in judgment to calculate, in
some special cases, the stationary fractions of good and bad
individuals in homogeneous populations. But this is just a
technical issue that allows us to resolve a degeneracy of
solutions, and there is no inconsistency because the results
do not depend on the value of this error.
The strategies which are stable against invasions by other
strategies sharing the same moral assessment turn out to also
be stable against invasions by any other strategy. This means
that if a strategy can resist the invasion of all the other strategies
that share its same moral assessment, it can resist any invasion
whatsoever.
We have checked that the higher the benefit-to-cos ratio is
and the lower the action errors are, the higher the number of
stable strategies obtained is. One possible interpretation of the
errors in action is a lack of resources. Under this interpretation
our results show that scarcity of resources favors invasions.
On the other hand, we have checked that populations whose
members receive a greater benefi for a given cost are more
resistant to invasions.
As pointed out in Ref. [16], there is a symmetry between
the moral assessments of the strategies. Good and bad are
just labels with no proper meaning, in contrast to actions,
which have a direct influenc in the payoffs. In order to break
that symmetry and provide a meaning to those labels we
have introduced the concept of coherence. Coherence links
moral assessments with action rules. We have shown that
stable strategies appear in pairs due to the above-mentioned
symmetry, but coherence values are complementary. This
allows us to choose only one of the strategies (the most
coherent) within each pair for later analysis and interpretation.
The stable strategies we obtain include the leading eight
found by Ohtsuki and Iwasa [16]. These are also the most
efficien ones (those with the highest payoffs). Both the
leading eight and the remaining stable strategies that we
have obtained share some features, and except for the two
least efficien strategies (with W˜H = 0.25), all of them obtain
high average payoffs (W˜H > 0.8). They identify defectors
[mGG(D) = mBG(D) = B] and, except the two least efficien
strategies, maintain cooperation [aGG = C and mGG(C) =
G]. All of them punish defectors (aGB = D), although three
of the stable strategies (with W˜H ∼ 0.9) do not judge this as
a good behavior. Finally, the most efficien stable strategies
(W˜H > 0.9) forgive bad individuals who help good players
[mBG(C) = G and aBG = C]. The higher the number of these
features the strategies follow is, the higher their payoff is.
For instance, the three strategies with W˜H ∼ 0.9 turn good
punishers into bad individuals, and they can only restore their
reputation by helping good individuals. And in the case of
strategies with W˜H < 0.9, bad individuals cannot increase
their reputation by helping good players, only by interacting
with other bad individuals.
We have also found that all these strategies may become
unstable if cheaters arise. If the probability of witnessing
a cheat is not high enough, cheaters can take over an
honest population. Upon increasing the cheating probability
pdis > c/b the population eventually turns into pure defectors.
Interestingly, the condition for a population to resist this effect
is of the Hamilton type, namely, bpdis > c, where b is the
benefi and c is the cost. Errors in action make this condition
even more restrictive for the stability of an honest population.
Cheating is always a danger for cooperation based on
indirect reciprocity. Even in societies where this mechanism
is of utmost importance cheating always threatens honest
behavior. For instance, the (now extinct) Patagonian tribes
of the Ya´mana are among the reported societies more strongly
based on indirect reciprocity [29]. Sharing food even with
nonrelatives appeared to be the default behavior. Not sticking
to it brought a bad reputation and severe social punishment
(e.g., not participating in further food sharing). Yet cheating
among the Ya´mana was reported to occur when chances of
being discovered were low (for instance, because the prey
obtained was easy to hide; see Ref. [29], p. 197).
One of the problems that emerges from considering dif-
ferent moral assessments is the possibility that the fractions
of good and bad individuals may depend on the initial setup.
We sort out this issue by choosing realistic initial conditions
for the differential equations describing the evolution of these
fractions. Essentially, we assume that mutations do not change
the previous judgments that individuals had of each other. This
notwithstanding, we have analyzed other initial conditions in
which not all individuals have the same opinion. A typical
setup where this might happen is when a rumor is spread over
a fraction of the population. We have checked that, although
misjudgment can survive or even spread over a larger fraction
of the population, it eventually disappears because mutants
with a wrong judgment get less payoff than residents who use
one of the stable strategies.
Admittedly, in order to carry out such a systematic analysis
as we have performed here, we have had to sacrific some
realism in the model. On the one hand, we have considered
that reputation can only have two states: good and bad. This
binary reputation has been used in several preceding studies
[16,23] and implies that only the actions that happen in the
last round are taken into account when assigning reputation.
However, Tanabe et al. [30] have studied a model with trinary
reputations and showed that some strategies (like the so-called
image scoring) can be stable in a trinary-reputation model
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but not in a binary-reputation one. On the other hand, we
have considered that every player has complete information
of every single interaction in the population (except when
we introduced cheating). This is too strong an assumption,
and some studies discuss the effect of limited access to the
information (see [31] and references therein).
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APPENDIX A
The two sets of Eqs. (8) and (9) can be simplifie in the
steady state dx/dt = 0. Thus, summing over the reputation
	2 in Eqs. (8), we obtain
xG∗1 =
∑
	2
x
G	2
1 = x1H . (A1)
Therefore we can reduce Eqs. (8) to just two equations in two
unknowns (e.g., xGG1 and x
BB
1 ) by setting
xGB1 = xG∗1 − xGG1 , xBG1 = 1 − xG∗1 − xBB1 . (A2)
The two remaining equations from (8) have to be solved
numerically using the initial conditions discussed in Sec. III B.
On the other hand, the set of Eqs. (9) is decoupled from the
set (8), and so they can be solved analytically after solving the
latter. This is easier if x∗G2 is calculated first
x∗G2 =
[
x∗G1 P2,01 +
(
1 − x∗G1
)
P2,00
][
1 + x∗G1 (P2,01 − P2,11)
+ (1 − x∗G1 )(P2,00 − P2,10)]−1. (A3)
Hence Eq. (9) reduces to a linear system of two equations in
the two unknowns xGG2 , x
BB
2 .
There are scenarios where the solution of x	1	22 turns out
to be degenerate. In these situations the set of Eqs. (9) needs
to be integrated along with the set of Eqs. (8).
APPENDIX B
Consider a resident population whose individuals play one
of the leading eight strategies with probability 1 − pch,1 but
defect otherwise. Consider mutants who do the same, but
with a probability 1− pch,2. For simplicity let us assume the
limiting case A → 0. Applying adaptive dynamics [32], the
curve separating the regions where the mutant can or cannot
invade the population is given by
dW (pch,2,pch,1)
dpch,2
∣∣∣∣
pch,2=pch,1
= 0, (B1)
where the payoff W (pch,2,pch,1) is equivalent to W (2|1).
According to Eq. (12),
dW (pch,2,pch,1)
dpch,2
= b dθ
ch
1,2
dpch,2
− c dθ
ch
2,1
dpch,2
. (B2)
To go further we need to separate the strategies of the three
groups.
1. Group I strategies
Using Eqs. (15) for the leading eight strategies, the
probabilities of cooperation θ chi,j are
θ ch1,2 = (1 − pch,1)
[
xch2 +
(
1 − xch1,H
)(
1 − xch2
)]
,
(B3)
θ ch2,1 = (1 − pch,2)
[
xch1,H +
(
1 − xch1,H
)(
1 − xch2
)]
.
Thus
dθ ch1,2
dpch,2
= (1 − pch,1) xch1,H
dxch2
dpch,2
,
(B4)
dθ ch2,1
dpch,2
= (1 − xch1,H )
[
xch2 − (1− pch,2)
dxch2
dpch,2
]
− 1.
The fractions xch1,H and x
ch
2 are obtained from Eqs. (4) and
(A3). To that purpose we need to substitute
P chi,11 = P chi,01 = 1 − pdispch,i , P chi,10 = 1 (B5)
and
P chi,00 = 1 − pdispch,i . (B6)
Thus xch1,H is the solution of
pdispch,1
(
xch1,H
)2 = (1− pdispch,1)(1 − xch1,H ), (B7)
and once it is obtained,
xch2 =
1 − pdispch,2
1 − (1− xch1,H )pdispch,2
,
(B8)
dxch2
dpch,2
= − pdisx
ch
1,H[
1 − (1 − xch1,H )pdispch,2]2 .
Substituting into (B4) and setting pch,2 = pch,1 ≡ pch yield
dθ ch1,2
dpch
= − (1 − pch,1)pdis
(
xch1,H
)2
[1 − pdispch
(
1 − xch1,H
)
]2
,
(B9)
dθ ch2,1
dpch,2
= x
ch
1,H [pdis
(
1 − xch1,H
)− 1][
1 − pdispch
(
1 − xch1,H
)]2 .
Therefore p∗dis is the solution of the system
p∗dis[b(1− pch)x∗ + c(1 − x∗)] = c,
(B10)
p∗dispch(x
∗)2 = (1− p∗dispch)(1 − x∗).
2. Group II strategies
For the strategies of this group
θ ch1,2 = (1− pch,1) xch2 , θ ch2,1 = (1− pch,2) xch1,H ; (B11)
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hence their derivatives are
dθ ch1,2
dpch,2
= (1 − pch,1) dx
ch
2
dpch,2
,
dθ ch2,1
dpch,2
= −xch1 . (B12)
Probabilities P chi,αβ are now given by (B5) as well as P
ch
i,00 = 1.
Thus, after Eqs. (4) and (A3),
xch1,H =
1
1 + pdispch,1 , x
ch
2 = 1 − xch1,Hpdispch,2. (B13)
Substituting into (B12) and setting pch,2 = pch,1 ≡ pch yield
dθ ch1,2
dpch,2
= − (1 − pch)pdis
1 + pdispch ,
dθ ch2,1
dpch,2
= − 1
1 + pdispch , (B14)
and therefore
p∗dis =
c
b (1 − pch) . (B15)
3. Group III strategies
For the strategies of this group the probabilities of coop-
eration and their derivatives are also given by Eqs. (B11) and
(B12), and the probabilities P chi,αβ are given by (B5) as well as
P chi,00 = 0. Thus, after Eqs. (4) and (A3),
xch1,H = 1 − pdispch,1, xch2 = 1 − pdispch,2. (B16)
Substituting into (B12) and setting pch,2 = pch,1 ≡ pch yields
dθ ch1,2
dpch,2
= −(1 − pch)pdis,
(B17)
dθ ch2,1
dpch,2
= −(1 − pdispch),
and therefore
p∗dis =
c
c pch + b (1 − pch) . (B18)
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